4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
mroberts 16ba06cc6d Sign commits made in the sandbox
The sandbox held no signing material, so its commits arrived unverified and a
branch rule requiring signatures rejected them outright. AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY
copies an SSH signing key into the sandbox and points both git and jj at it.

The private half genuinely lands in the sandbox, which is why this is opt-in
and documented as signing-only: an agent that can read the key can sign as
you. A signing key grants no repository access and is revocable on its own,
so the exposure is forged attestation rather than reach. Forwarding an agent
socket would avoid the copy, but a socket passed over virtiofs is visible and
unconnectable from the guest, and the TCP workaround is a worse trade.

Setup refuses a passphrase-protected key rather than letting the failure
surface on the agent's first commit, and writes an allowed_signers entry so
the sandbox can verify what it just signed. jj is configured through conf.d,
which is read after config.toml and so overrides the host key path a copied
dotfile carries.
2026-08-05 13:30:09 -05:00
mroberts e0f6113320 Rewrite GitHub SSH remotes to HTTPS in the sandbox
The in-container clone inherits origin verbatim from the host, which is
commonly an SSH URL. Nothing in the sandbox can satisfy SSH: there is no key
and port 22 is closed. Only HTTPS carries the Authorization header the proxy
substitutes the repository token into, so every push failed.

Setup now writes a global insteadOf rewrite for both SSH spellings. Doing it
globally rather than per-remote covers the clone, anything the agent clones
later, and submodules, and leaves the host's own .git/config untouched under
--direct, where the working tree is bind-mounted read-write.
2026-08-05 13:30:09 -05:00
mroberts b5dfae0696 Keep the stored GitHub token when setup runs again
The secret store outlives the sandbox, so recreating one to change its image
or add a profile does not lose the token. Prompting for a replacement anyway
made --replace impractical and trained the habit of minting tokens that are
never revoked.

Only a token scoped to this sandbox counts. A global one would authenticate
the agent too, but reaching every repository it can reach is what this task
exists to prevent. The token command still always prompts; it is the way to
replace an expired or revoked token.
2026-08-03 16:09:44 -05:00
mroberts 53db7df812 Give the sandbox a UTF-8 locale
A sandbox image ships without a locale, leaving LC_CTYPE at POSIX. Every
multibyte glyph then degrades to a placeholder, so Nerd Font icons in the
editor render as underscores and bash printf emits \uXXXX escapes literally.

The locale is probed for usability rather than matched by name, because
locale -a spells C.UTF-8 as C.utf8 on glibc and a name match would silently
find nothing. LANG alone is set, leaving individual categories overridable.
2026-08-03 15:26:41 -05:00
6 changed files with 523 additions and 7 deletions
+37 -2
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@@ -243,6 +243,13 @@ gh pr list
gh pr create --fill
```
So is `git push`. The clone inherits `origin` from the host, which is usually an SSH
URL, and SSH cannot work in the sandbox — there is no key and port 22 is closed. A
global `insteadOf` rewrites `[email protected]:` and `ssh://[email protected]/` to
`https://github.com/`, so the push traverses the proxy and picks up the token. Remotes
on other hosts are left alone, and under `--direct` the host's own `.git/config` is
never touched.
AWS named profiles work as Terraform expects:
```bash
@@ -263,8 +270,8 @@ provider "aws" {
| Command | Effect |
| --- | --- |
| `setup [options]` | Configure the repository, create the sandbox, open the token form, install AWS profiles, Claude configuration and plugins, and mise |
| `token` | Replace the GitHub token for this repository — expiry, revocation, permission change |
| `setup [options]` | Configure the repository, create the sandbox, open the token form if no token is stored yet, install AWS profiles, Claude configuration and plugins, and mise |
| `token` | Replace the GitHub token for this repository — expiry, revocation, permission change. Always prompts |
| `run [--launch MODE] [-- args...]` | Refresh AWS credentials and the repository's mise tools, then attach to the agent or to a tmux workspace |
| `refresh` | Refresh AWS credentials, without attaching |
| `config` | Re-apply your Claude configuration, plugins and dotfiles after the host changes, without recreating the sandbox |
@@ -296,6 +303,7 @@ provider "aws" {
| `AI_SBX_NETWORK` | unset | hosts to allow through the sandbox network policy, comma or space separated |
| `AI_SBX_LAUNCH` | `agent` | `run --launch agent\|tmux` |
| `AI_SBX_DOTFILES` | unset | `chezmoi` renders the host's dotfiles into the sandbox |
| `AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY` | unset | host path to an SSH signing key; its private half is copied in so the sandbox can sign commits |
## The tmux workspace
@@ -328,6 +336,33 @@ AI_SBX_TOOLS = "bun tmux neovim"
Without `tmux` the launcher says so and starts the agent directly.
## Signing commits from the sandbox
By default the sandbox holds no signing material, so its commits arrive unverified.
`AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY` points at an SSH signing key on the host and copies **its private
half** into the sandbox:
```toml
AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY = "~/.ssh/id_ed25519_signing"
```
Setup then writes `gpg.format`, `user.signingkey`, `commit.gpgsign` and `tag.gpgsign`
into the sandbox's global git config, and an `allowed_signers` entry mapping the
repository's `user.email` to the key so the sandbox can verify what it just signed. jj
is pointed at the same key through `~/.config/jj/conf.d/10-ai-sbx-signing.toml`, which
is read after `config.toml` and so overrides the host path a copied dotfile carries.
This is the one place the sandbox is deliberately given a real credential, so the
constraints are narrow:
- **Use a key that only signs.** An agent that can read the key can sign as you. A
signing key grants no repository access and is revocable on its own, so the worst
case is forged attestation rather than reach. Never point this at an authentication
key.
- **No passphrase.** Nothing in the sandbox can answer a prompt. Setup refuses an
encrypted key rather than letting every commit fail at the moment of signing.
- **Both halves must exist.** git names the signing key by its `.pub`.
## Carrying your dotfiles into the sandbox
`AI_SBX_DOTFILES=chezmoi` renders your chezmoi target state **on the host** — where the
+177 -2
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="${AI_SBX_TEMPLATE:-}"
DEFAULT_TOOLS="${AI_SBX_TOOLS:-bun}"
DEFAULT_NETWORK="${AI_SBX_NETWORK:-}"
DEFAULT_LAUNCH="${AI_SBX_LAUNCH:-agent}"
DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY="${AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY:-}"
DEFAULT_DOTFILES="${AI_SBX_DOTFILES:-}"
# Rendered dotfiles are checked for these before the archive enters the sandbox.
@@ -83,8 +84,10 @@ Usage:
mise run ai:sbx -- status
mise run ai:sbx -- remove
Setup opens a pre-filled GitHub token form in your browser. Use "token" on
its own to replace an expired or revoked token later.
Setup opens a pre-filled GitHub token form in your browser, unless a token is
already stored for the sandbox. The secret store outlives the sandbox, so
recreating one with --replace keeps its token. Use "token" on its own to
replace an expired or revoked token.
Set AI_SBX_TEMPLATE in your mise config to reuse one custom image across
every repository without repeating --template.
@@ -119,6 +122,13 @@ AI_SBX_TOOLS lists mise tools installed globally in the sandbox, defaulting
to bun because several Claude plugins run their hooks under it. Set it to an
empty string to install none.
AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY is the path to an SSH signing key on the host. Its private
half is copied into the sandbox, so the agent can sign as you: use a key that
signs and nothing else, and never an authentication key. Unset, the default,
leaves the sandbox unable to sign and its commits arrive unverified. The key
must not be passphrase-protected, because nothing in the sandbox can answer
the prompt. git and jj are both pointed at it.
Setup and run install mise in the sandbox and resolve the repository's
pinned tools, so the agent runs the same versions you do. A personal
mise config that must stay out of the repository goes in the per-repository
@@ -242,6 +252,17 @@ read_token() {
printf '%s' "$token"
}
# Only a token scoped to this sandbox counts. A global one would authenticate
# the agent too, but reaching every repository the token can reach is exactly
# what this task exists to prevent, so it is not treated as satisfying setup.
sandbox_has_github_token() {
sbx secret ls 2>/dev/null |
awk -v scope="$SANDBOX_NAME" '
$1 == scope && $2 == "service" && $3 == "github" { found = 1 }
END { exit !found }
'
}
install_github_token() {
local url
url="$(token_url)"
@@ -1055,6 +1076,140 @@ EOF
'
}
# A sandbox image ships without a locale, which leaves LC_CTYPE at POSIX. Every
# multibyte glyph then degrades to a placeholder: Nerd Font icons in the editor
# render as underscores, and bash printf emits \uXXXX escapes literally. LANG
# alone is enough, and leaves a user free to override individual categories.
install_sandbox_locale() {
# shellcheck disable=SC2016
sbx exec "$SANDBOX_NAME" bash -c '
persistent=/etc/sandbox-persistent.sh
marker="# BEGIN ai-sbx locale"
if grep -Fq "$marker" "$persistent" 2>/dev/null; then
exit 0
fi
# locale -a spells these inconsistently across distributions, so probe
# each one for usability rather than matching its name.
for candidate in C.UTF-8 en_US.UTF-8; do
if LC_ALL="$candidate" locale >/dev/null 2>&1; then
chosen="$candidate"
break
fi
done
[[ -n "${chosen:-}" ]] || exit 0
cat >>"$persistent" <<EOF
# BEGIN ai-sbx locale
export LANG=$chosen
# END ai-sbx locale
EOF
' </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
# The in-container clone inherits origin verbatim from the host, which is
# commonly an SSH URL. Nothing in the sandbox can satisfy SSH - there is no key
# and port 22 is closed - and only HTTPS carries the Authorization header the
# proxy substitutes the GitHub token into. Rewriting globally covers the clone,
# any repository the agent clones later, and every submodule, while leaving the
# host's own .git/config untouched under --direct.
install_sandbox_git_https() {
# shellcheck disable=SC2016
sbx exec "$SANDBOX_NAME" bash -c '
key="url.https://github.com/.insteadOf"
# insteadOf is multi-valued, so a plain set would replace the first
# form with the second and a repeat setup would accumulate duplicates.
git config --global --unset-all "$key" 2>/dev/null
git config --global --add "$key" "[email protected]:"
git config --global --add "$key" "ssh://[email protected]/"
' </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
printf 'Could not rewrite GitHub SSH remotes to HTTPS in %s.\n' \
"$SANDBOX_NAME" >&2
}
# The private half genuinely lands in the sandbox, which is why the key is
# opt-in and must be signing-only: an agent that can read it can sign as you.
# A signing key is separately revocable and grants no repository access, so the
# damage is forged attestation rather than reach.
install_sandbox_signing_key() {
[[ -n "$DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY" ]] || return 0
local private="${DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY/#\~/$HOME}"
local public="$private.pub"
[[ -f "$private" ]] ||
die "AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY does not exist: $private"
[[ -f "$public" ]] ||
die "No public half beside $private. SSH signing needs both, and git names the signing key by its .pub."
ssh-keygen -y -P '' -f "$private" >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
die "$private is passphrase-protected. Nothing in the sandbox can answer the prompt, so every commit would fail at the moment of signing. Use a dedicated signing key with no passphrase."
local principal
principal="$(git -C "$REPO_ROOT" config user.email)" ||
die "The repository has no user.email, so signatures could not be attributed to a principal."
local sandbox_home
# shellcheck disable=SC2016
sandbox_home="$(sbx exec "$SANDBOX_NAME" bash -c 'printf %s "$HOME"')"
[[ -n "$sandbox_home" ]] ||
die "Could not determine the sandbox home directory."
local staging
staging="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$staging"' RETURN
local name
name="$(basename "$private")"
mkdir -p "$staging/.ssh"
install -m 600 "$private" "$staging/.ssh/$name"
install -m 644 "$public" "$staging/.ssh/$name.pub"
# Without a principal mapping git reports "No principal matched" for the
# signatures it just produced, so the sandbox cannot verify its own commits.
printf '%s %s\n' "$principal" "$(cat "$public")" \
>"$staging/.ssh/allowed_signers"
tar -C "$staging" -cf - .ssh |
sbx exec -i "$SANDBOX_NAME" tar -x -C "$sandbox_home" ||
die "Could not copy the signing key into $SANDBOX_NAME."
# shellcheck disable=SC2016
sbx exec "$SANDBOX_NAME" bash -c '
set -e
name="$1"
chmod 700 "$HOME/.ssh"
chmod 600 "$HOME/.ssh/$name"
chmod 644 "$HOME/.ssh/$name.pub" "$HOME/.ssh/allowed_signers"
git config --global gpg.format ssh
git config --global user.signingkey "$HOME/.ssh/$name.pub"
git config --global commit.gpgsign true
git config --global tag.gpgsign true
git config --global gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile "$HOME/.ssh/allowed_signers"
# jj reads conf.d after config.toml, so the host key path a copied
# dotfile carries is overridden without editing a file chezmoi owns.
mkdir -p "$HOME/.config/jj/conf.d"
cat >"$HOME/.config/jj/conf.d/10-ai-sbx-signing.toml" <<EOF
[signing]
backend = "ssh"
key = "$HOME/.ssh/$name.pub"
EOF
' _ "$name" </dev/null ||
die "Could not configure commit signing in $SANDBOX_NAME."
printf 'Installed the signing key %s into %s.\n' "$name" "$SANDBOX_NAME"
}
validate_launch_mode() {
case "$1" in
agent | tmux) ;;
@@ -1321,7 +1476,15 @@ setup_command() {
create_sandbox
fi
# The secret store outlives the sandbox, so recreating one to change its
# image keeps the token. Prompting anyway would train the habit of minting
# replacement tokens and never revoking the old ones.
if sandbox_has_github_token; then
printf 'Keeping the GitHub token already stored for %s. Replace it with: mise run ai:sbx -- token\n' \
"$SANDBOX_NAME"
else
install_github_token
fi
install_sandbox_aws_files
@@ -1329,6 +1492,12 @@ setup_command() {
install_sandbox_dotfiles
# After the dotfiles: the allowlist may carry a .gitconfig, which would
# otherwise land on top of the rewrite.
install_sandbox_git_https
install_sandbox_signing_key
install_sandbox_network
install_sandbox_secrets
@@ -1381,6 +1550,10 @@ config_command() {
install_sandbox_dotfiles
install_sandbox_git_https
install_sandbox_signing_key
install_sandbox_network
install_sandbox_secrets
@@ -1427,6 +1600,8 @@ run_command() {
# runs every time rather than only at setup.
install_sandbox_mise
install_sandbox_locale
if [[ "$launch" == tmux ]]; then
install_sandbox_workspace
+69
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@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# shellcheck source-path=SCRIPTDIR
# shellcheck source=tasks/ai/sbx
source "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../tasks/ai/sbx"
failures=0
work="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
fail() {
printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "$1" >&2
failures=$((failures + 1))
}
HOME="$work/home"
SANDBOX_NAME=ai-test
mkdir -p "$HOME"
sbx() {
[[ "$1" == exec && "$2" == "$SANDBOX_NAME" && "$3" == bash && "$4" == -c ]] ||
fail "unexpected sbx invocation: $*"
HOME="$HOME" bash -c "$5"
}
resolved() {
git -C "$work/repo" ls-remote --get-url origin
}
git init --quiet "$work/repo"
for remote in \
'[email protected]:owner/repo.git' \
'ssh://[email protected]/owner/repo.git'; do
rm -f "$HOME/.gitconfig"
git -C "$work/repo" remote remove origin 2>/dev/null || true
git -C "$work/repo" remote add origin "$remote"
[[ "$(resolved)" == "$remote" ]] ||
fail "$remote was already rewritten before the sandbox was configured"
install_sandbox_git_https
[[ "$(resolved)" == 'https://github.com/owner/repo.git' ]] ||
fail "$remote resolved to $(resolved), not an HTTPS URL"
done
install_sandbox_git_https
install_sandbox_git_https
values="$(HOME="$HOME" git config --global --get-all \
'url.https://github.com/.insteadOf' | wc -l)"
[[ "$values" -eq 2 ]] ||
fail "repeated setup left $values insteadOf values, expected 2"
git -C "$work/repo" remote set-url origin '[email protected]:owner/repo.git'
[[ "$(resolved)" == '[email protected]:owner/repo.git' ]] ||
fail "a non-GitHub remote was rewritten to $(resolved)"
((failures == 0)) ||
exit 1
printf 'ok: GitHub SSH remotes are rewritten to HTTPS inside the sandbox\n'
+90
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@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
TASK="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)/tasks/ai/sbx"
# shellcheck source-path=SCRIPTDIR
# shellcheck source=tasks/ai/sbx
source "$TASK"
failures=0
fail() {
printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "$1" >&2
failures=$((failures + 1))
}
SANDBOX_NAME=ai-repo-abc123
listing=""
sbx() {
printf '%s\n' "$listing"
}
with_listing() {
listing="$1"
sandbox_has_github_token
}
full_listing() {
cat <<'EOF'
SCOPE TYPE NAME SECRET
ai-repo-abc123 service github (stored)
(global) service anthropic (oauth configured)
CUSTOM SECRETS
SCOPE TARGETS ENV PLACEHOLDER SECRET
ai-repo-abc123 localstack.cloud LOCALSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN sbx-cs-0c2f39c1 ls-vOL***
EOF
}
with_listing "$(full_listing)" ||
fail "a sandbox-scoped github token was not detected"
with_listing "$(
cat <<'EOF'
SCOPE TYPE NAME SECRET
(global) service anthropic (oauth configured)
EOF
)" && fail "no github token stored, yet setup would have been skipped"
with_listing "$(
cat <<'EOF'
SCOPE TYPE NAME SECRET
(global) service github (stored)
EOF
)" && fail "a global github token must not satisfy a per-repository sandbox"
with_listing "$(
cat <<'EOF'
SCOPE TYPE NAME SECRET
ai-other-sandbox service github (stored)
EOF
)" && fail "another sandbox's github token must not count as this one's"
with_listing "$(
cat <<'EOF'
CUSTOM SECRETS
SCOPE TARGETS ENV PLACEHOLDER SECRET
ai-repo-abc123 github.com github sbx-cs-abc gh***
EOF
)" && fail "a custom secret must not be mistaken for the stored service token"
with_listing "" &&
fail "empty output should mean no token, not a stored one"
grep -q 'if sandbox_has_github_token; then' "$TASK" ||
fail "setup no longer guards install_github_token"
awk '/^token_command\(\)/, /^}/' "$TASK" | grep -q 'install_github_token' ||
fail "the token command must always prompt; it is the way to replace one"
awk '/^token_command\(\)/, /^}/' "$TASK" | grep -q 'sandbox_has_github_token' &&
fail "the token command must not skip when a token exists"
if ((failures)); then
printf '%d assertion(s) failed\n' "$failures" >&2
exit 1
fi
printf 'All GitHub token assertions passed.\n'
+13 -2
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@@ -47,8 +47,12 @@ dispatch() {
cat "$SBX_LOG"
}
[[ "$DEFAULT_LAUNCH" == agent ]] ||
fail "AI_SBX_LAUNCH unset should default to agent, got: $DEFAULT_LAUNCH"
(
unset AI_SBX_LAUNCH
# shellcheck source=tasks/ai/sbx
source "$TASK"
[[ "$DEFAULT_LAUNCH" == agent ]]
) || fail "AI_SBX_LAUNCH unset should default to agent"
(
AI_SBX_LAUNCH=tmux
@@ -87,6 +91,13 @@ DEFAULT_LAUNCH=agent
[[ "$(dispatch -- --launch tmux)" == *"run ai-test -- --launch tmux"* ]] ||
fail "--launch after -- belongs to the agent, not to the task"
DEFAULT_LAUNCH=agent
locale_dispatch="$(dispatch)"
[[ "$locale_dispatch" == *"BEGIN ai-sbx locale"* ]] ||
fail "run should install a UTF-8 locale, or Nerd Font glyphs render as placeholders: $locale_dispatch"
[[ "$locale_dispatch" == *"LC_ALL=\"\$candidate\" locale"* ]] ||
fail "the locale must be probed for usability, not matched by name against locale -a"
if (validate_launch_mode bogus) 2>/dev/null; then
fail "an unknown launch mode was accepted"
fi
+136
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@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# shellcheck source-path=SCRIPTDIR
# shellcheck source=tasks/ai/sbx
source "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../tasks/ai/sbx"
failures=0
work="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
fail() {
printf 'FAIL: %s\n' "$1" >&2
failures=$((failures + 1))
}
SANDBOX_NAME=ai-test
SANDBOX_HOME="$work/sandbox-home"
REPO_ROOT="$work/repo"
mkdir -p "$SANDBOX_HOME"
git init --quiet "$REPO_ROOT"
git -C "$REPO_ROOT" config user.email [email protected]
sbx() {
[[ "$1" == exec ]] ||
fail "unexpected sbx invocation: $*"
shift
if [[ "$1" == -i ]]; then
shift 2
"$@"
return
fi
shift
if [[ "$1" == bash && "$2" == -c ]]; then
local script="$3"
shift 3
HOME="$SANDBOX_HOME" bash -c "$script" "$@"
return
fi
fail "unexpected sbx exec command: $*"
}
sandbox_git() {
HOME="$SANDBOX_HOME" git config --global --get "$1"
}
mode() {
stat -c '%a' "$1"
}
ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C signing -f "$work/signing" </dev/null
ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N 'locked' -C locked -f "$work/locked" </dev/null
DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY=""
install_sandbox_signing_key
[[ ! -e "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh" ]] ||
fail "an unset AI_SBX_SIGNING_KEY still put a key in the sandbox"
DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY="$work/absent"
(install_sandbox_signing_key) 2>/dev/null &&
fail "a missing signing key was accepted"
DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY="$work/signing"
mv "$work/signing.pub" "$work/signing.pub.hidden"
(install_sandbox_signing_key) 2>/dev/null &&
fail "a signing key with no public half was accepted"
mv "$work/signing.pub.hidden" "$work/signing.pub"
DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY="$work/locked"
(install_sandbox_signing_key) 2>/dev/null &&
fail "a passphrase-protected signing key was accepted"
DEFAULT_SIGNING_KEY="$work/signing"
install_sandbox_signing_key >/dev/null
[[ -f "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/signing" ]] ||
fail "the private signing key was not installed"
[[ "$(mode "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh")" == 700 ]] ||
fail ".ssh is mode $(mode "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh"), expected 700"
[[ "$(mode "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/signing")" == 600 ]] ||
fail "the private key is mode $(mode "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/signing"), expected 600"
diff -q "$work/signing" "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/signing" >/dev/null ||
fail "the installed private key does not match the host key"
[[ "$(cat "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/allowed_signers")" == \
"[email protected] $(cat "$work/signing.pub")" ]] ||
fail "allowed_signers does not map the repository principal to the key"
[[ "$(sandbox_git commit.gpgsign)" == true ]] ||
fail "commit signing was not enabled in the sandbox"
[[ "$(sandbox_git tag.gpgsign)" == true ]] ||
fail "tag signing was not enabled in the sandbox"
[[ "$(sandbox_git gpg.format)" == ssh ]] ||
fail "the signing format is $(sandbox_git gpg.format), expected ssh"
[[ "$(sandbox_git user.signingkey)" == "$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/signing.pub" ]] ||
fail "user.signingkey points at $(sandbox_git user.signingkey)"
[[ "$(sandbox_git gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile)" == \
"$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/allowed_signers" ]] ||
fail "allowedSignersFile points at $(sandbox_git gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile)"
override="$SANDBOX_HOME/.config/jj/conf.d/10-ai-sbx-signing.toml"
grep -Fqx "key = \"$SANDBOX_HOME/.ssh/signing.pub\"" "$override" 2>/dev/null ||
fail "jj was not pointed at the key installed in the sandbox"
grep -Fqx 'backend = "ssh"' "$override" 2>/dev/null ||
fail "the jj signing backend was not set to ssh"
signed="$work/signed"
git init --quiet "$signed"
HOME="$SANDBOX_HOME" git -C "$signed" \
-c user.name=Malcolm -c user.email=[email protected] \
commit --quiet --allow-empty -m probe
status="$(HOME="$SANDBOX_HOME" git -C "$signed" log -1 --format='%G?')"
[[ "$status" == G ]] ||
fail "the sandbox produced a commit with signature status $status, expected G"
((failures == 0)) ||
exit 1
printf 'ok: the sandbox signs and verifies its own commits\n'